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INDIFFERENTISM REDUX: REFLECTIONS ON
CATHOLIC LOBBYING IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Winnifred Fallers SullivaW:
Stephen Carter's Tl Culture of Disbelief was published in 1993.
In subsequent years the book has attained almost iconic status. It
need only be mentioned to receive a knowing nod of recognition and
approbation. Carter's main point-that religious belief is scorned in
American public life-is so widely accepted that its assertion is usually
simply prologue to another point. All seem to assume that the only
remaining question is what is to be done about it. This assertion and
the assumptions that underlie it have also increasingly become a part
of the discourse about religion in the Supreme Court of the United
States. Chief Justice Rehnquist is probably the strongest voice on the
Court for Carter's position. His dissenting opinion in Santa Fe Inde-
pendent School District v. Doe2 is typical. It begins with the accusation
that the majority opinion invalidating the school prayer provision of a
Texas school district "bristles with hostility to all things religious in
public life."3 A similar sentiment was expressed by Justice Thomas in
his opinion for the plurality in Mitchell v. Helms.4 "[I]t is most bizarre
that the Court would, as the dissent seemingly does, reserve special
hostility for those who take their religion seriously, who think that
* Dean of Students and Senior Lecturer at The Divinity School, The University
of Chicago, and member of the Illinois bar.
1 STEPHm L. CARTn, THE CULTURE OF DisBEuEPx: How A-,rIcuN L~w AND
Pourcs TRIv.LuE RELIGIOUS DEvOTON (1993). For a discussion of the pitfalls of
using "belief" as a synonym for religion, see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Diss-ing Rlig-
ion: Is Religion Trivialized in Ameican Public Discourse, 75 J. RELcioGi 69 (1995) (re-
viewing CARTR, supra). See also Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Belief, in CRmrLc T.R.tS FOR
REulous SrDIES (Mark C. Taylor ed., 1998). This Essay was written before Presi-
dent Bush's enthusiastic endorsement of "faith-based initiatives." Interestingly, I
think the President's speech and actions would not change most people's continued
agreement with Carter's thesis.
2 530 U.S. 290, 318-326 (2000) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
3 Id. at 318.
4 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (plurality).
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their religion should affect the whole of their lives, or who make the
mistake of being effective in transmitting their views to children.", A
strong line is drawn by Carter, Rehnquist, and Thomas between those
whose motivations and activities are "faith-based," to use the now-fash-
ionable adjective, and those whose motivations and activities are not.
Debate over interpretation of the First Amendment Religion
Clauses, 6 like other sectors of the debate about the appropriate role of
religion in American public life, has come to rest for many on the
assumption that religion fights for survival in a generally unfriendly
and secular public environment. It is, in fact, a curious paradox that
in the world's most religious post-industrial country-far outstripping
its natural peers in Europe and elsewhere in conventional measures of
personal piety-many religious people across the religious and politi-
cal spectrum consider religion, religious people, and their concerns
to be somehow fundamentally threatened in the United States.
Where do Catholics fit into this story? For most of American his-
tory, Catholics have not been understood to occupy a central part in
the history of American religion. Until quite recently in fact, as re-
cently perhaps as the 1970s, American Catholics were a footnote to
the story of American religion because "American religion" was simply
assumed to mean mainstream Protestant Christianity.7 Catholics and
others were a pretext for the debate about the First Amendment, not
full participants in that conversation. Indeed, Catholics today, flushed
with political success and preoccupied as they are with the sea changes
rocking their Church, seem to have a curious amnesia about the ex-
tent to which anti-Catholicism propelled earlier Protestant positions
on the separation of church and state and many other public ques-
tions. Religion was expelled from public schools, not because of hos-
tility to religion, but because of hostility toward Catholics and fear that
Catholics would demand and be given equal time and money. The
Roman Catholic school system developed in response to this Protes-
tant attitude.8 Catholics today seem so eager to be regarded as full
Americans, or so confident of their capacity to control the debate
5 Id at 2551.
6 I am somewhat reluctant to use the expression Religion "Clauses" in this Essay
given Judge Noonan's known dislike of the expression, but I bow to convention. See,
e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 81 (1998).
7 See RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE (David G. Hackett ed., 1995); RELIGION
IN AMERIcAN HISTOR. A READER (Jon Butler & Harry S. Stout eds., 1998) (attempting
to survey the new historiographical landscape).
8 See JAY P. DoLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIc EXPERIENCE 262-93 (1985) (discuss-
ing the evolution of the Catholic parochial school system).
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within the Church, that they are willing to join political forces ith
styles of religion they formally condemn and that have historically
condemned them on behalf of a religious consensus that is peculiarly
non-Catholic.
This Essay wil reflect on recent lobbying accomplished through
amicus filings in the United States Supreme Court by the United
States Catholic Conference (USCC). The positions taken by the
USCC in recent religion cases will be considered in relation to the
public theology of the Church as expressed in various Vatican docu-
ments. The Essay concludes that the amicus filings of the Catholic
bishops reflect a drift during the last fifty years towards a position es-
pousing affirmative legal protection for "religion-in-general"-a posi-
tion that both coincides with the "accommodationist" or "non-
preferential" position on the First Amendment held by certain legal
scholars and creates a tension with established Church doctrine. The
promotion of "religion-in-general" indeed bears a certain resem-
blance to the nineteenth-century sin of indifferentism. It is a by-prod-
uct, as the Catholic jeremiads of the nineteenth century predicted, of
modernity and of the full integration of the American Catholic com-
munity into the larger American political and religious community.
"Religion" in America now includes the Roman Catholic Church, and
the Church wants to be part of it.
The USCC is the official lobbying arm of the National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops. Both of these organizations were formed in
response to a Vatican directive after the Second Vatican Council (Vati-
can II) mandating the formation of national bishops' conferences. 9
In the United States they appeared as successors to the National Cath-
olic War Council, formed during World War I, and its successor, the
National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC), formed after the w~ar.W
The legal office of the NCWC was formed in 1920.11 One of its first
tasks involved counseling of Mexican bishops in response to legal sup-
pression of the Church in Mexico. 12 The United States Catholic Con-
ference today has a full legal staff led by an experienced and
9 The Second Vatican Council was a gathering of the Roman Catholic bishops of
the world held in the Vatican between 1962 and 1965. These gatherings are known as
ecumenical councils and have been held periodically since the fourth century, C.E.
See R.F. Trisco, Vatican Council 1, in 14 NEw GATHOLiC ENC'C.OPEDA 563-72 (The
Cath. Univ. of Am. ed., 1967).
10 See ToMAs J. REEsE, A FLOCK OF SHEPHERDs: THE NMnou. CoNrENLcE OF
CATHOUC BISHOPS 23-24 (1992).
11 See Ud.
12 See id at 26.
2001]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
professional General Counsel, Mark Chopko.' 3 Chopko's office per-
forms the usual tasks of in-house counsel, including advice on permis-
sible political activity, employment, tax, and immigration law. The
Office of the General Counsel also engages in legislative lobbying,
participates in rule-making, and files amicus briefs in selected cases at
all levels of the state and federal courts, 14 including cases directly con-
cerning interpretation of the First Amendment. The Office occupies
an interesting intersection between that most American of all its insti-
tutions, the American legal system, and that arguably most un-Ameri-
can of its institutions, the Roman Catholic Church.
Indifferentism. The peculiarly Catholic' 5 sin of indifferentism
has a slightly archaic and refined neo-scholastic ring about it. It seems
out of place in the context of the post-Vatican II Church. One feels as
if it would take careful effort and some education to commit such a
sin. One feels that it must have vanished along with scrupulosity and
bther old-fashioned sins, now replaced by an entirely new model of sin
and of confession-the Sacrament of Reconciliation. Some would say
that sin itself has been displaced. 16 Indifferentism is, however, a very
modern sin. Invented in the nineteenth century, indifferentism is a
product of Roman Catholicism's response to modernity, and, like
many critiques of modernity, it finds a resonance in the discourses of
post-modernity. Indifferentism is the sin of erasing difference.
According to the New Catholic Encyclopedia, indifferentism is "[a]
doctrinal system that exalts the attitude (internal) that all philosophi-
cal opinions, all religions, and all ethical doctrines regarding life are
equally true and valuable," and it may be divided into three types:
irreligious indifferentism, naturalistic indifferentism, and supernatu-
ral indifferentism. 17 Indifferentism was condemned by the Church
throughout the nineteenth century by a succession of popes: Leo XII,
13 See id. at 216-17; see also Interview with Mark Chopko, General Counsel,
United States Catholic Conference in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 1995).
14 See Office of General Counsel (Mar. 3, 2000), at http://iv.usccb.org/ogc/
index.htm.
15 The difficulties surrounding the use of "Catholic" to characterize attributes of
Roman Catholics are legion. As in the use of all such umbrella identities, awareness
of the pluralisms within that tradition is particularly acute right now. In this Essay, I
will use "Catholic" loosely to describe a religious culture defined in large part by the
mainstream official teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and "the Church" to
refer to that institution.
16 See DoLAN, supra note 8, at 434 (discussing the new understanding of sin in the
late twentieth century).
17 T.F. McMahon, Indifferentism, in 7 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 9,
at 469.
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Gregory XVI, Pius IX, and Pius XII. 8 Indifferentism in religious mat-
ters-irreligious indifferentism-was equated with atheism, with a de-
nial of the existence of God. Indifferentism was held to lead to
licentiousness, corruption of youth, and "desire of innovation," along
with a host of other modem ills.19 Indifferentism is also condemned
by name in the most recent Vatican document on religious pluralism,
Dominus Jesus,20 albeit with a somewhat lighter touch. Dominus Iesus
condemns indifferentism as a "mentality" produced by relativism.21
One sees in Dominus lesus a greater effort to persuade, not merely to
pronounce, as in the earlier condemnations, but the dangers of relig-
ious pluralism are clearly articulated.
The sin of indifferentism-the danger of acknowledging relig-
ious pluralism-was, before Vatican II, in part to be fought through
fidelity to a church-state theory that held that the state had an obliga-
tion to teach and act according to true religious doctrine and that the
ideal state was one in which the Roman Catholic Church was legally
established. The official teaching of the Church was embodied in the
frequent observation that "error has no rights."22 Other religions, in-
cluding "separated" Christian churches, might be tolerated for practi-
cal political reasons (on the assumption that a lesser eil might be
allowed to further a greater good), but theologically they had no
place in the economy of salvation. Vatican II made obsolete this neo-
Thomist theological discourse and inaugurated a new age of Catholic
openness to modernity and to the truths of other religious traditions.
In Lumen Gentium (the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church),2 Nos-
tra Aetate (the Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-
18 See I RIcHARD P. McBmEN, CATHoLCISM 274-75 (1980) (noting that religious
indifferentism was condemned in Ubi Primum (1824), Mirari Vos Arbitramur (1832),
QuiPluribus (1846), Singulari Quadam (1854), Quanto Co,!fidamurMowore (1863), and
the Syllabus of Errors (1864)). Indifferentism was also condemned at the First Plenary
Council of India (1950). Id. at 275.
19 POPE GREGORY XVI, ON LIBERALISM AND RELIGIOUS INDIFFERENTISM [Mira r 1%$
Arbiiramur] No. 15, excerpted inJ.F. MACLEAR, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODE AGE
136-37 (1995).
20 POPEJOHN PAUL II, DECLARATION ON THE UNICrYAND SA.VInc UNVERSLIY OF
JESUS CHRIST AND THE CHURCH [Dominus Jlems] No. 22 (Aug. 6, 2000), available
at http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc-con_
cfaith_doc_20000806_dominusiesusen.html.
21 See id.
22 See, ag., Derek Cross, Tolerance as a Catholic Docrine, FIRST Tm.NGS, 1992, at
38-44.
23 SECOND VATICAN EcuzmNIQn.L COUNSEL, DOGMATIC CONSTITUIroN ON THE
CHURCH [Lumen Gentium], in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICN II, at 14 (Walter M. Abbott
ed., 1966).
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Christian Religions), 24 Ad Gentes (the Decree on the Church's Mis-
sionary Activity),25 and Gaudium et Spes (the Pastoral Constitution on
the Church in the Modem World),26 Vatican II apparently completely
repudiated the Church's former attitude toward religious pluralism.
These documents emphasized that truth was to be found in other re-
ligious traditions and that the appropriate attitude towards other re-
ligious traditions should be one of respect and openness to dialogue.
While Vatican II did not abandon the Church's teaching that salvation
was accomplished only through the saving act of Jesus Christ, the ac-
tual route to heaven for any one person could be one of faithful ad-
herence to another religious path.2 7
Church-state theory was likewise revolutionized at Vatican II in
Dignitatis Humanae (the Declaration on Religious Freedom),28 the
document in which the Catholic Church, in effect, abandoned its
claims to be a "church"-coextensive with society-in the sense of
Ernst Troeltsch. 29 Based on a fundamental acknowledgment of the
"dignity of the human person" and of the need for religious choices to
be free from coercion, human persons were declared to have a "right"
to religious freedom, not merely to religious tolerance. 0 Religious
communities were declared, likewise, to have a corollary right to relig-
ious freedom, because "[r] eligious bodies are a requirement of the
social nature both of man and of religion itself."3 ' A hotly debated
issue at Vatican II, the Dignitatis Humanae was the document most in-
fluenced by American Catholic thinking and experience. John
Courtney Murray, an American Jesuit who had been silenced by the
Church in the 1950s for his writing on church-state matters, was a per-
24 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE RELATIONSIIIP OF
THE CHURCH TO NoN-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS [Nostra Aetate], in THE DOCUMENTS or VAT.
ICAN II, supra note 23, at 660.
25 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECREE ON THE CHURCH'S MISSIONARY
AcTrry [Ad Gentes], in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 23, at 584.
26 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE
CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD [ Gaudium et Spes], in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II,
supra note 23, at 199.
27 This theology is affirmed in POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 20, No. 20-22.
28 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
[Dignitatis Humanae], in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 23, at 675.
29 2 ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES
993-1013 (Olive Wyon trans., 1950).
30 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 28.
31 Id. No. 4, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 23, at 682.
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itus32 at the Council and participated in the drafting of the Declara-
tion.33 Murray had long argued that American Catholics could
support the First Amendment unreservedly, because the American
constitutional order, unlike European constitutional orders, was
founded in natural law, not in hostility to religion. He labored to
explain this distinction to a Vatican which was still reacting to the
French Revolution.
The declarations of Vatican 11 concerning religious freedom and
diversity and the spirit they embody provided welcome relief to a ghet-
toized and defensive Catholic church, both to church members and to
sympathetic onlookers-those the Council addressed as "[a]ll persons
of good will."3 5 They moved well beyond John Courtney Murray's
practical politics. He had urged the need for religious freedom for
the sake of civil peace while all the while continuing to assert that
religious pluralism is against the will of God.3 6 The documents of Vat-
ican II seem to go further. They seem, rather, to find religious plural-
ism embedded in the human condition:
Men look to the various religions for answers to those profound
mysteries of the human condition which, today even as in olden
times, deeply stir the human heart: What is a man? What is the
meaning and purpose of our life? What is goodness and what is sin?
What gives rise to our sorrows and to what intent? Where lies the
path to true happiness? What is the truth about death, judgment,
and retribution beyond the grave? What, finally, is that ultimate
and unutterable mystery which engulfs our being, and whence we
take our rise, and whither our journey leads us?37
The expansive and open tone of this paragraph is typical of the tone
set by the documents of Vatican II.
32 A peritus is a theologian officially appointed to advise an ecumenical council.
Murray was appointed a peritus in the Second Session of the Council at the urging of
Cardinal Spellman.
33 XAvIr RYN, VATICAN COUNCIL II 458 (1968).
34 See the essays collected in JoHN COURTNEv ,MURRA, WE How THEsE TRuTHS:
CATHOLIC REFL1CriONS ON THE AMEIm w PRoPosmoN (1960).
35 James Tunstead Burtchaell, Religious Freedon, in MODERN CATHouctsM: V \i-
CAN II AND A~rR 122 (Adrian Hastings ed., 1991).
36 See generally MuRRAY, supra note 34. For a general introduction to Murray's
thinking on religious freedom, see J. Leon Hooper, General Introdudion to JOHNv
COURTNEY MURRAY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTVr CATHOUC STRUGGLES WMI PLURAISMI I (J.
Leon Hooper ed., 1993). See also KEriHJ. PAVUSCHEK, JOHN COURTNY MURRAY AND
THE DiFLwmA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION (1994).
37 SECOND VAncAN EcuMENICAL COuNcI, Nosira Arfale, supra note 24, in TuE
Docu.mrs OF VATICAN II, supra note 23, at 661.
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The broad and optimistic political and religious anthropology of
Vatican II represents, as yet, however, more an aspiration than the
fruit of a fully worked out theology and public philosophy with respect
to the apparently acknowledged fact of religious pluralism. The docu-
ments of Vatican II seem to demand a singularly delicate balancing
act with respect to religious diversity, one that at once both embraces
religious pluralism and rejects it. The Catholic Church in the United
States, as in other countries', found itself, quite abruptly, in an entirely
different doctrinal relationship to politics, to the state, and to other
religions.38 No longer simply a provisional practical tolerance of the
secular state and of religious diversity awaiting the arrival of a Catholic
state, the Church has appeared to wholeheartedly embrace the Ameri-
can arrangement with respect to religion. Forty years later, it seems
that it is going to take time to understand the new position and to
formulate a detailed "Catholic" understanding of the new-both phil-
osophical and theological. Unreflective appropriation of the Ameri-
can experience and the equation of Vatican II political theology and
the American constitutional order with respect to religion can teeter
on the edge of indifferentism, particularly in the context of coopera-
tive religious lobbying with a secular government.3 9
John Courtney Murray's arguments on behalf of religious free-
dom, asJ. Leon Hooper explains, depended on a classicist canonical
cognitional theory.40 By using an understanding of natural law as co-
extensive with American constitutional theory, Murray was able to sup-
port "the American proposition"-as he called it-without giving full
acknowledgment to the rights of atheists and without spelling out the
way in which and the extent to which saving truth resided outside the
magisterium.41 Hooper argues that Dignitatis Humanae, notwithstand-
ing its affirmation of the unacceptability of political intolerance, is still
supported within a Catholic theology that contains a dogmatic intoler-
ance of other religious and non-religious truths. 42 In other words,
Hooper suggests, there is some hypocrisy, or at least apparent serious
internal contradiction within the Church's position-one that may in-
38 It is important to emphasize the "doctrinal." American Catholic leaders across
the spectrum beginning with John Carroll in the eighteenth century have enthusiasti-
cally urged on the Vatican acceptance of the new situation of the Church in the
United States with respect to disestablishment and religious liberty. See DOLAN, sllpra
note 8, at 101-24.
39 This tendency is a concern in Dominus Iesus.
40 See Hooper, supra note 36, at 43.
41 See id.
42. See iL at 44.
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hibit its honest participation in the public square.43 Hooper himself
proposes a project of theological reconstruction founded in the theol-
ogy of Bernard Lonergan. This new theology would find a reconcilia-
tion of the two truths that the Roman Church is the one true Church
and that truth exists in other religious traditions, notin a paternalistic
inclusiveness of the partial revelation shared by other religions, but in
a historically grounded rather than timeless theology that begins in
faith in a Lord of History who reveals Himself in the "tangles of
human living."44 Whatever the theological strategy, Hooper warns of
the urgent need for new theologizing on this subject" 5 He com-
mends Murray's later work in which he had begun to confront these
questions.46
The need for a reconstruction of the Church's relationship to the
secular state and of its understanding of religious pluralism comes at a
time of heightened politicization and general public rethinking of all
of the issues surrounding the role of religion in a religiously plural,
secular American state, a rethinking conducted in the American con-
text in the shrill atmosphere of interest group politics. It also comes
at a time of deep divisions within the Catholic community. In the
thirty-odd years since the closing of the Council, public debate about
the role of religion in the United States and elsewhere has become
increasingly intense and increasingly polarized while internal debate
about a whole range of ecclesiological questions has absorbed much
energy in the Church itself. For the Catholic Church this situation
means the simultaneous participation in an American public debate
about the role of religion, the dominant strain of which at the present
seems to be the need to protect and promote religion, and an internal
debate about its own relationship to other religious communities.
This bifocal gaze is not just a Catholic problem. The perceived need
for the protection and promotion of "religion-in-general" causes a the-
ological problem for all religious communities: does the embracing of
religious pluralism as a fact of the human condition necessarily mean
that religious truth can never be exclusive? Or that it can never be
true? New theologies of church and state are being worked on or are
urgently needed in other religious communities as well, and this re-
construction of the relationship of religion to the secular state is also
happening around the giobe.47 The Catholic case is being used here
43 See id. at 40.
44 Id at 44.
45 Id. at 40-45.
46 Id. at 45.
47 SeeJost CASANOVA, PUBuC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN 'ORLD (1994) (rework-
ing the secularization thesis to explain the emergence of public (as opposed to pri-
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as an exemplar of a wider structural problem with legal protection for
religious freedom in a time of radical pluralism, mobility, and
globalization.
Putting aside for a moment the Church's own internal reflec-
tions, the American Catholic Church also participates in the larger
American public debate about religion at a number of levels in a num-
ber of different guises. There were more than fifty million American
Catholics according to the 1990 census.48 It is impossible to genera-
lize in any meaningful way about the politics of this group as a whole
at this point in American history. The group includes people with a
range of relationships to the Catholic Church as an institution and
with a whole spectrum of political views of varying intensity on a huge
range of topics. Catholics participate in the political process as indi-
viduals and as members of groups relating to their employment, gen-
der, regional location, party affiliation, national origin, and of course
with respect to particular political issues, such as the environment.
On religious issues, Catholics are publicly represented officially
through their bishops, but also increasingly through politically fo-
cused Catholic lay organizations. One way, however, Catholics are
represented in the Supreme Court is through the filing of amicus
briefs by the general counsel of the USCC.
Amicus curiae briefs are filed, usually on appeal, by non-parties
who have a particular interest in the litigation or in a point of law
which is in dispute, and who serve, in effect, as ad hoc advisers to the
court. Permission of the court is usually required for the filing of such
briefs. In the United States Supreme Court, an amicus brief may be
filed either if all of the parties to the case consent or if permission is
granted upon motion to the Court.49 The initial rationale for permit-
ting such filings in American courts was that attorneys should be able
to provide legal advice to courts in order to protect the courts from
legal error. Today amici are understood to have a wide range of roles
and may provide the Court with valuable perspectives of many differ-
ent sorts on the case which may be missing from the briefs of the
parties. Amici have gone from being disinterested bystanders-al-
most always lawyers-to interested non-parties, usually organizations
vate) religion in modem secular states); see also FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, TmE MEANING
OF RELIGIOUs FREEDOM: MODERN POLrICS AND THE DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION, at ix
(1995) (discussing "whether the political principles of religious freedom make sense"
by examining views of religious plurality and rationales justifying plurality).
48 WILLIAM H. NEWMAN & PETER L. HALVORSEN, ATIAS OF AMERICAN RELIGION:
THE DENOMINATIONAL ERA, 1776-1990, at 69-72 (2000).
49 Sup. CT. R. 37.
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with a cause. Over the course of time amici have moved, as Samuel
Krislov argues, "from friendship to advocacy."50
The filing of amicus briefs may be traced back to Roman law, but
their widespread use is a comparatively recent development.5 ' Since
the 1960s permission is routinely granted for the filing of amicus
briefs in the United States Supreme Court.52 There has been an enor-
mous increase in the filing of amicus briefs in the Supreme Court in
the last thirty or forty years. In the ten years between 1946 and 1955
the number of amicus briefs filed was 531. 5 3 Between 1986 and 1995
the number was 4907, an increase of 800%. 54 This increase corre-
sponds to a period of increased politicization of the Court's docket as
well as to an increase in civil rights legislation and a growth in interest
group politics. It is also the period during which the Court has been
involved in interpreting the First Amendment Religion Clauses.
The First Amendment Religion Clauses, which are introduced by
the phrase "Congress shall make no law," 5 were applicable only to
Congress until 1940. In 1940 the Court "incorporated" the First
Amendment Religious Free Exercise Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause and thereby made it applicable to
the States.56 In 1947, the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.5 7 Because
most religion cases arise as a result of state rather than federal action
or legislation, interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment by the Supreme Court is largely a phenomenon of the
50 Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief" From Friendship to Advotaq, 72 YAME UJ.
694 (1963) (giving a history of the use of the amicus brief). This now somewhat
dated article remains the most frequently cited authority on the subject.
51 See Leo Pfeffer, Amid in Churd-State Litigation, 44 LAw & Com,,i. PRoDs. 83,
83 (1981).
52 Id. at 85.
53 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The hluence ofAmicus Curiae Briefi on
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 752 (2000).
54 IM
55 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56 This "incorporation" was accomplished by using the enumerated rights of the
Bill of Rights to supply the detail for the general assertion of rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as
accomplished in Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In Cantwdl, a Connecti-
cut law prohibiting door-to-door solicitation was declared unconstitutional, because it
violated the free exercise rights ofJehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 307.
57 See Everson . Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In E,erson, the Court, while
announcing a very high standard of church-state separation, held constitutional a
New Jersey statute reimbursing parents for the cost of busing their children to paro-
chial school, on the ground that children, not religion, benefited from the expendi-
ture of public funds. Id. at 17-18.
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second half of the twentieth century, unlike that of other parts of the
Constitution.58 Amicus participation in this process has been intense.
Both religious and secular organizations have participated as ami-
cus curiae in Supreme Court religion cases since 1940 but their partic-
ipation has greatly increased over the years and their number has
proliferated.5 9 The participation of amici who make regular filings
can have influence over time as particular amici, such as the Solicitor
General of the United States, develop a reputation for good and relia-
ble advice. Amicus briefs can also, at times, be seen to have made a
discernible difference in the opinions of the Justices in particular
cases. 60 The influence of amici, according to commentators, depends,
in part, on the strength of the parties' briefs-whether the amici add
a significantly different point of view or whether they simply serve to
say "me, too." However, as Krislov notes, amicus briefs may serve
other functions, apart from influencing the Justices, within their own
organizations. 61 Amicus briefs may serve as a location for the con-
struction and display of identity, whether or not the Supreme Court is
listening. Indeed many amicus briefs may be written primarily for an
audience other than the Court.
After having only occasionally filed amicus briefs beginning, with
Pierce v. Society of Sisters62 and having decided not to file in Everson v.
Board of Education,63 the USCC has, since Everson, regularly filed ami-
cus briefs in First Amendment cases. It is, however, selective about the
cases in which it files and files less frequently than either mainstream
Jewish and Protestant organizations or the American Civil Liberties
,Union.64 Still, patterns can be discerned in the USCC's First Amend-
ment filings. It is clear that care is taken in the selection of cases in
58 For a subtle historical exploration of the effect that this delayed incorporation
has had on First Amendment jurisprudence, see generally MARK DE WoLFt How',
THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AzERICAN CONsi rtt-
TIONAL HISTORY (1965).
59 For a description of the principal amici organizations filing briefs in religion
cases, see Pfeffer, supra note 51, at 86-94. See generally PAUL J. WVEBER & W. LANDIS
JONES, U.S. RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS: INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES (1994) (discussing
120 religious interest groups).
60 See, e.g., McCollum V. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 229 n.19 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
61 See Krislov, supra note 50, at 720-21.
62 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court held in Pierce that parents had a right to send
their children to private (in this case, Catholic) schools rather than public ones, pro-
vided they met state education standards. I. at 534-35. Pierce was not a First Amend-
ment case.
63 See supra note 51 for a description of Everson.
64 See Pfeffer, supra note 51, at 93.
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which to make amicus filings and that an overall philosophy of the
First Amendment and of the position of the Roman Catholic Church
in relation to the First Amendment informs those filings.6
As a general matter, the USCC files amicus briefs in two kinds of
cases, both of which raise what the USCC understands to be "Catho-
lic" issues. 66 As one voice in the public square seeking to influence
American public policy, it files briefs on a range of issues which corre-
spond to the bishops' social agenda as outlined by the USCC both in
its mission statement and in periodic statements of legislative goals
and objectives. 67 Such "social justice" cases include those touching on
euthanasia, abortion, immigration, obscenity laws, school prayer, and
poverty. Briefs are also filed in cases that may affect the Church's le-
gal and constitutional status as an institution. Thus, the USCC has
filed briefs in cases concerning the political rights of religious groups,
the taxation of religious institutions, a variety of employment issues,
and aid to parochial schools, among others.68
Cutting across the specific legal and constitutional questions at
issue in each of these two kinds of cases is the larger question of the
overall historical and jurisprudential interpretation of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, a highly contested area of constitu-
tional interpretation. In the last twenty to thirty years scholrs have
engaged in an intense debate over the historical evidence surround-
ing the adoption of the First Amendment. These scholars fall roughly
into two groups: "separationists" see the First Amendment primarily as
effecting a structural separation of religion and government and a
corresponding prohibition of government aid to religion; "accom-
modationists" see the First Amendment primarily as effecting an af-
firmative mandate in favor of freedom of religion and to require,
therefore, certain forms of government aid to religion, including ex-
emption from neutral laws of general application, which incidentally
prohibit religious activity as well as equal participation in federal fund-
ing programs. There are variations on both of these positions.
The byword of the revisionist project of the second group, the
"accommodationists," has become the assertion that the First Amend-
65 These larger conclusions are based on a reading of all of the amicus filings of
the USCC in the United States Supreme Court. This Essay focuses rather on the most
recent ones which will be cited to individually.
66 See, eg., Abortion Rights Mobilization v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1989).
67 The 1981 Mission Statement and the NCCB/USCC Goals and Objectives,
1991-96 are reproduced in REEsE, supra note 10, at app. A-B. Se also USCC website,
http://-vv.usccb.org/chronological.htm.
68 See supra note 65.
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ment was originally intended to protect religion from the state rather
than the state from religion. 69 Rarely is this statement qualified either
with an admission that the legislative history of the First Amendment
will not support the assertion of such clarity of intent one way or the
other or that "original intent" is a highly compromised method of
constitutional interpretation. "Proof" that the First Amendment Re-
ligion Clauses have such an overarching intention affirmatively to pro-
tect religion is attempted by selectively expanding the relevant
historical materials beyond the writings of Madison and Jefferson
commonly referred to by the Court to include those of the many
eighteenth-century "religious" advocates of separation of church and
state, such as Isaac Backus, and by careful selective reading of the his-
torical record on the nature of colonial establishments. 70 This strat-
egy is intended to show that Jefferson and Madison were actually in
the minority and that the Supreme Court has erred in using the Vir-
ginia experience, beginning with the campaign for the Virginia Stat-
ute for Religious Freedom, as the privileged historical antecedent f6r
understanding the First Amendment.7' The most enthusiastic spokes-
person on the Court for this interpretation of the First Amendment
has been ChiefJustice Rehnquist.7 2 In the course of this effort a very
close relationship has developed between the academic legal commu-
nity and the growing activist legal community committed to the pro-
motion of religious liberty.73 Academic legal scholars either write or
advise on many of the amicus briefs filed by religious groups in the
Supreme Court.
The USCC has been actively involved in this apologetic reinven-
tion of First Amendment colonial legislative history. The USCC
69 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Sup-
port of Petitioners at 6-7, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (1999) (No. 98-1648); Mark
E. Chopko, Intentional Values and the Public Interest-A Plea for Consistency in Church/
State Relations, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1143, 1144 (1990). The term "accommodationits"
is quoted from ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 556
(1950).
70 See, e.g.,JoHN Wnrr, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUONAL EXPLRI.
MENT (2000).
71 See Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amici Curiae in Support
of the Respondent at 8-12, Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996) (No. 95-2074), writ-
ten by Michael McConnell, Professor of Law at the University of Utah. This is a large
and growing body of literature. Scholarly contributions to this effort include RoEtRT
L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICrION
(1982); WrrE, supra note 70; and Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1990).
72 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73 See Mark Curriden, Defenders of the Faith, A.B.A., Dec. 1994, at 86, 89.
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funded a major work of revisionist history entitled Freedom from Federal
Establishment,74 a publication of the Institute for Church-State Law of
the Georgetown University Law Center. A lay Catholic publication en-
titled First Things has also been founded to address the interpretation
of the First Amendment.7 5 Amicus Briefs of the USCC rehearse the
"accommodationist" position.7 6 For example, in its brief in Bender v.
Willimn-sport Area Schwol Distric, the USCC argued, "The Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses were intended by the framers to be comple-
mentary and provide comprehensive protection for religious lib-
erty."77 Following this statement is the quote from Anson Stokes to
the effect that the First Amendment Religion Clauses "were adopted
not as a protection from religion, but rather as a protection for relig-
ion."7 8 USCC briefs are full of repeated appeals for the need for the
government to affirmatively aid "religion-in-general" through support
of the autonomy of religious institutions.79
In all this debate about the intentions of the founders, however,
beyond a rejection by almost everyone except Justice Scalia of the
opinion/act dichotomy,8 0 there has been very little discussion of what
this "religion" is that is either being protected or being kept apart,
from either a theological perspective within religious communities or
74 CHEsTERJAtMs ANTiAU, ARTHUR T. DowN v & EDwARD C. RoBrs, FREE.oo.t
FROM FEDERAL EsrABLisHmN'r. FORMAnoN AND E.IuuY HISTORY OF ThE FIRST A.,n'-
IMNT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964).
75 FRnsT THINGS: AJouRNAL OF RELIGION AND PUB'uc bFE, is published in New
York. The first issue was published in 1990.
76 See, eg., Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 4-6, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (No. 91-948); Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17-19, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(No. 90-1014); Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 7-12, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (No. 87-253);
Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appel-
lants at 7-10, Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (No. 86-
179); Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 7-16, Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990); Brief of the
United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
7-13, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (No. 82-195); Brief of the United States
Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3-5, Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (No. 80-689).
77 Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 9, Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U. S. 534 (1986) (No. 84-
773).
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 2, Bowen (No. 87-253).
80 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-78 (1990).
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from a religious studies perspective from outside religious communi-
ties.81 What exactly is it that is entitled to accommodation? The sup-
posed threat to "religion," or "faith," or "belief," which is a staple of a
certain contemporary political rhetoric, depends, I would argue, on
having the word "religion" remain a placeholder in the sentence to be
supplied by each hearing believer. Each religious actor may then
fight for his or her own religious vision while making common cause
with those with radically different understandings of the meaning and
structure of the world.
Is this studied ambiguity necessary to First Amendment jurispn-
dence? Is it constitutional? Is it Catholic? Does interpretation of the
First Amendment require having a referent for the word "religion"?
Historians would agree that "religion" has had a chamelion-like qual-
ity over the course of American history, but it has never been more
unstable than it is at present. It is, perhaps, both inevitable and desir-
able that a category like "religion"-as it is used in legal documents-
is constantly changing its colors as circumstances change. While at-
tention to this process is valuable in any event, the dangers of ambigu-
ity are more acute, I would argue, when "religion" is actually being
promoted. The content becomes more urgent when religion is in-
tended to be the beneficiary of an affirmative government effort,
rather than being one of two partners in an evolving structural separa-
tion of spheres. For reasons thatJohn Courtney Murray understood,
policing the borders between religion and the state is troublesome for
those who do it, but it does not raise the same thorny theological and
philosophical problems as does affirmative promotion-or even ac-
commodation-of religion by the state. This dynamic can be seen to
be at work in the litigation under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act82 and its state counterparts.83
The intensity of the recent debate over the Religion Clauses ar-
guably begins with the Court's decision in Employment Division v.
81 These two efforts are related because religion scholars must depend on theolo-
gians'to articulate the theology of their communities and theologians must depend
on scholars of religion to describe and analyze the plurality of human religious expe-
rience. Both are needed in constructing a public conversation about the meaning of
the First Amendment. For two recent descriptions of these difficulties, see CRIuIGLxt
TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES (Mark C. Taylor ed., 1998); Robert Orsi, Everyday Mira-
des: The Study of Lived Religion, in LIVED RELIGION IN AwMRIcA 3, 5-6 (David D. Hall ed.,
1997).
82 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994).
83 See, e.g., Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03
(West 2000). Other state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts are cited in Brief of
Appellants, Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (No.
99-13730-EE).
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Smith.84 In Smith the Court held that two members of the Native
American Church, fired from their jobs as substance abuse counsel-
ors, were not entitled to unemployment compensation because they
had been constitutionally fired for cause because of their sacramental
use of peyote, a regulated narcotic.85 The Court rejected a First
Amendment claim that the two had a right under the Free Exercise
Clause to the use of peyote as a sacrament.86
Certain First Amendment cases have been perceived by the ac-
tivist community as having the specific potential to threaten religion,
all religion, "religion-in-general." Supreme Court cases which raise
the issue of the appropriate governmental relationship to "religion-in-
general" provoke amicus filings from a range of religious interest
groups, including Catholic groups. The Smith decision is one such
example. Major religious organizations across the political and theo-
logical spectrum have banded together, particularly and more strenu-
ously since the decision in Smith, to rescue the First Amendment and
the country from secularizing tendencies.87 The political activities on
behalf of this effort, which resulted in passage of the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA),8s have also resulted in an expansion of
religious lobbying of the Supreme Court and in the creation of new
alliances across formerly hostile denominational divides. "We have
people who cannot agree on how to get to heaven, but we are to-
gether on this one issue-all our religious freedoms are decaying."89
The USCC, in its restrained Catholic way, has entered the fray.
While General Counsel Mark Chopko says that he is attempting a
careful balance between allegiance with other groups on behalf of "re-
ligion-in-general" and an attention only to Catholic issues in the nar-
rowest sense,90 the public persona of the USCC in the Supreme Court
is one which has gradually shifted, I would argue, towards an activist
promotion of governmental protection of religion. Chopko notes, for
example, that the USCC did not join in the coalition to lobby for
RFRA because of its concern about the effect of RFRA on the abortion
84 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
85 Id. at 890.
86 Id. at 882.
87 Arguably the roots of this situation go back toJustise Black's equation of relig-
ion and non-religion in Everson v. Board of Eduration, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
88 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994). RFRA was subsequently held to be an
unconstitutional congressional usurpation of power in Ciy ofBoerne v. Rores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997).
89 Curriden, supra note 73, at 86, 87 (quoting Alan Sears, President of tie Alli-
ance Defense Fund).
90 Interview ivith Mark Chopko, General Counsel, United States Cadolic Confer-
ence, in Washington, D.C. (June 4, 1996).
20011 100 9
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
debate, does not belong to the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Re-
ligion, and will not join other religious lobbying groups in behalf of
satanic cults in prisons. 91 On the other hand, the USCO continues to
lobby for school vouchers although similar dangers of losing Catholic
specificity and of having the content of "religion" be determined by
governmental interests are present there, and USCC briefs reflect the
accommodationist project.
Chopko says that the USCC is sometimes suspected by other relig-
ion lobbyists of being typically Catholic: of acting ecumenical when it
suits them-cooperating in "religion-in-general" lobbying, for exam-
ple-while their fingers are crossed behind their backs.92 They are
willing to lobby the government only for those things that affect Cath-
olic religious objectives, narrowly understood, and they continue,
these critics argue, to use Catholic theological standards for judging
the salvation of people of other faiths. In spite of the generosity of the
words of Vatican II, the Church in its legal persona is still relying on
Murray's assertion that the United States is founded in natural law.
Mark Chopko speaks publicly of the pro-religion stance of the Consti-
tution and of the threat of secularism, but there remains a gap be-
tween this balancing act on the part of the Office of the General
Counsel and what has often been perhaps an overly expansive reading
of the documents of Vatican II.
The USCC's most recent amirus filings in First Amendment cases
have been in two school cases, Agostini v. Felton9 3 and Mitchell v.
Helms.94 Agostini concerned the constitutionality of the provision of
remedial education by public school teachers in private schools under
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,9, Title I had
been declared unconstitutional in Aguilar v. Felton.96 Mitchell con-
cerned the constitutionality of Chapter 2 of the Education Consolida-
tion and Improvement Act of 1981,9 7 a federal law providing
educational materials to private schools. Together, Agostini and Mitch-
ell have created considerable conflict over First Amendment jurispru-
91 Id
92 Id.
93 Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Support of
Petitioners, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (No. 96-552).
94 Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Support of
Petitioners, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648).
95 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-6514 (West 2000 & Supp. 2000).
96 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985).
97 Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 463-82 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 7301-7373 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
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dence with respect to the constitutionality of various forms of
government aid to religious schools.
In its Brief in Support of Petitioners in Agostini, one of eight filed
in the case, the USCC reviewed Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and argued strenuously for an overturning of both Lemon s and Agui-
lar.99 In the course of its brief, the USCC repeatedly stressed that the
religious freedom protected by the First Amendment has two aspects:
personal religious liberty and institutional autonomy. 00 Any test
under the Establishment Clause, it asserted,
must provide for absolute impartiality of treatment for religion, and
among religions. In order to do so, two interests must both be
served, rather than spuriously seeming to be weighed against each
other. Personal religious liberty must at all times be protected from
encroachment by the state, and the institutional autonomy of both
governmental and religious institutions must not be impinged
upon. Neither must be permitted to intrude into the institutional
prerogatives of the other.101
The USCC also insisted that the state has an "affirmative obligation to
accommodate religion," arguing that religious schools can keep secu-
lar and religious instruction separate and to assume othense is to
demonstrate "hostil[ity] to religious belief itself."102
Aguilarwas indeed overturned by Agoslini. The 5-4 majority held
that to offer remedial instruction by public school teachers in paro-
chial schools in New York was not an unconstitutional establishment
of religion, because the act did not (1) have the effect of inculcating
religion, (2) use religious criteria to select recipients, or (3) result in
excessive entanglement between government and religion.' 03 'While
Agostini was a victory of sorts for advocates of greater aid to parochial
schools, the Court fell far short of the sweeping statements about the
rights of religion urged by amici. The Court seems more comfortable
with something like neutrality in Philip Kurland's famous formula-
tion: law should not use religion as a category either for the disadvan-
tage or for the advantage of religion.' 0 4 Law should rather go about
98 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
99 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Support
of Petitioners at 3, 25-28, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (No. 96-552).
100 Id. at 3, 16-17, 21-25.
101 Id. at 3.
102 Id at 4.
103 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230, 232, 234-35 (1997).
104 See PHnI? B. KURLN, RELIGION AND THE LAN%: OF CHURCH AND STATEXXD THE
SuPRNEM COURT 112 (1961).
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its business-here of ensuring equal access to education-and let the
chips fall where they may.
The USCC sometimes argues in favor of neutrality and sometimes
in favor of a special status for religion. 10 Neutrality, it seems to say,
should be the rule when government benefits are being handed
out.10 6 Special treatment, on the other hand, should be the rule when
religion wishes to exempt itself from regulation. 0 7 Sometimes it
makes both arguments in the same brief.'08 In its brief in Mitchell
supporting the constitutionality of Chapter 2, the USCC first argues
that the constitutionality of aid to parochial schools can bejudged on
the basis of whether it is religion or religious activity that is at issue.l °9
"Religion qua religion"-for example, worship, proselytizing, liturgy,
doctrine, and selection and supervision of clergy and the tasks that
support them-cannot, according to the USCC's brief, receive gov-
ernment aid." 0 Religiously motivated action can. While the distinc-
tion between "religion qua religion" and religion not qua religion is
not transparent, several pages later the brief quotes the Court to the
effect that "[a] law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows
churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose.""' This
would seem to be a reference to government aid for "religion qua
religion." This kind of neutrality would seem to be exquisitely de-
signed, asJustice Brennan noted in his dissent in Lynch v. Donnelly,112
"to offend believers and non-believers alike."" 3 The majority had suc-
ceeded in keeping Christ in Christmas by declaring the crche to be
"devoid of any inherent meaning."" 4 Likewise current lobbyists for
religion, including the USCC, seem to be trying to raise the public
105 See Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of the Respondents at 8-12, Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996) (No. 95-2074);
Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Support of the Peti-
tioners at 14-25, Agostini (No. 96-552).
106 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Support
of Petitioners at 14-25, Agostini (No. 96-552).
107 See Brief of the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Stp,
port of the Respondents at 8-12, Boerne (No. 95-2074).
108 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Support
of the Petitioners at 14-25, Agostini (No. 96-552).
109 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Support
of Petitioners at 16-17, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648).
110 Id. at 6-12.
111 Id. at 18.
112 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
113 Id. at 712 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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profile of religion at the expense of rendering it entirely without dis-
tinction or importance.
Justice Thomas's opinion for the plurality in Mitchell"15 proposed
a radically streamlined approach to Establishment Clause cases. The
LemonI1 6 test is restated as having two, rather than three, parts: Does
the law in question have either the purpose or the effect of advancing
religion?117 In testing effect, the Court is to be guided by a principle
of neutrality.
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the
State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to
the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad
range of groups or persons without regard to their religion. If the
religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for govern-
mental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any
particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the
government.118
Like the USCC, Thomas seems to argue that neutrality means that
religion is entitled to government benefits on the same basis as any
other institution. Religion should not make a difference.
The effect of the plurality's restatement of the Establishment
Clause case law is, as Justice Souter says in dissent, to overturn the
principle enunciated in Everson,a" 9 but amply testified to by the Foun-
ders, that government may not support religious instruction. "To the
plurality there is nothing wrong with aiding a school's religious mis-
sion; the only question is whether religious teaching obtains its tax
support under a formally evenhanded criterion of distribution. The
principle of no aid to religious teaching has no independent signifi-
cance."' 20 In footnotes Souter challenges the assertion of the USCC
and the plurality that there is no danger in funding "religion qua re-
ligion" because religious and secular instruction can be easily sepa-
rated.' 2 ' Indeed, the Justice quotes official Catholic teaching that
they should not. In fact, religious education in Roman Catholic
schools is defined as part of required religious practice; aiding it is
thus akin to aiding a church service.' 2 2 Justice Souter also points out
115 See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. at 2530, 2536-56 (2000) (plurality opinion).
116 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
117 See id
118 Mitche!!, 120 S. Ct. 2541.
119 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 380 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1947).
120 Mitche!, 120 S. Ct. at 2541 (Souter, J., dissenting).
121 See id. at 2588-89, n.17; 2591, n.19; 2596, n.28.
122 Id. at 2582-83; see 1983 CODE c.798 (directing parents to entrust children to
Roman Catholic schools or otherwise provide for Roman Catholic education), c.800,
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that, far from being .irreligious, the principle of no aid has strong re-
ligious support. "[The plurality] equates a refusal to aid religious
schools with hostility to religion (as if aid to religious teaching were
not opposed in this very case by at least one religious respondent and
numerous religious amici curiae in a tradition claiming descent from
Roger Williams)."123 Amici curiae to which he refers include the Bap-
tist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, The Interfaith Religious Lib-
erty Foundation, and the National Committee for Public
Education. 124
In its brief in Agostini, in a section entitled "A New Approach to
the Interpretation of the Establishment Clause Must be Undertaken
Here," the USCC begins with several assertions about the circum-
stances surrounding the promulgation of the First Amendment that
are almost universally acknowledged by historians. First, that the
founding generation, for the most part, believed religion to be essen-
tial to the maintenance of public order and the promotion of public
virtue.' 25 Second, that the First Amendment, to the extent that such
an intent can be discerned, was intended simply to confirm the inca-
pacity of Congress to establish a national church, a jurisdictional
rather than an ideological claim. 126 Finally, that at the time of passage
of the First Amendment there was great diversity among the States
with respect to the legal regulation of religion.' 27 It is very difficult to
find any consensus beyond these points. The rest of this section of the
USCC's brief in Agostini, however, moves from this generally accepted
but rather bare bones history to grand attribution of ideological mo-
tive to the founding generation.' 28 There are no more citations to the
Founders but rather extensive attribution of intention to "history" and
the use of the passive voice.
History indicates that the Establishment Clause was intended to pro-
hibit the preference of one religion over another .... Benevolence
toward religion was not perceived as an evil. Rather, support and en-
couragement of religion was perceived to be in the public good....
§ 2 (requiring the faithful to support establishment and maintenance of Roman Cath-
olic schools), cc.802, 804 (requiring diocesan bishop to establish and regulate schools
"imparting an education imbued with the Christian spirit"), reprinted in T-m CODE OF
CANON LAiv: A TExT AND COMMENTARY 566-68 (James A. Coriden, Thomas J. Green,
& Donald E. Heintschel eds., 1985).
123 Mitchel4 120 S. Ct. at 2597 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
124 See id. at n.31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic Conference in Support
of Petiioners at 14-25, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (No. 96-552).
126 See id at 14-17.
127 See id at 15.
128 See id& at 21-25.
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The Establishment Clause was not meant to drive a wedge between
church and state, but rather to avoid those relationships between
the two which pose a realistic threat of impairing religious
liberty.129
By whom? Where? When? These are our issues, not theirs.
The Catholic Church, as it has "come of age" and taken its place
with other American "denominations," has tended to move away from
concern with issues that touch primarily on "Catholic" issues to partic-
ipation in a more general lobbying of the Court on the meaning of
the First Amendment and in defense of "religion-in-general." For ex-
ample, it has changed its position on school prayer. The Catholic
position on prayer in public schools until 1948 was that it should be
abolished, because it was Protestant. 3 0 Now, prayer in schools is seen
as important, because it is one of the frontiers of defending religion,
of putting religious values back into public life.13 ' The American
Catholic Church is now one religious group among man)' banding to-
gether to lobby, like a trade association does, for legislation and court
decisions that will favor its product. What was once regarded as a
dangerous Protestant defacto establishment is now regarded as an ac-
ceptable "Judaeo-Christian" de facto establishment-which includes
Catholics.' 3 2 Mark Chopko is a member of an association of general
counsels for churches and other religious organizations that meet reg-
ularly, like the counsels of other trade associations, to discuss com-
mon legal issues.' 3 3
The USCC is arguing in its briefs today that neutrality means that
religion should be treated the same as other recipients of government
benefits. This is the argument that was made and accepted by the
Court in Rosenberger v. Rector.'34 "Neutrality," as a First Amendment
value, can be traced directly to Everson.135 Mark de Wolfe Howe in
The Garden and the Wildenesse 36 argues persuasively that neutrality in
the sense that religion and non-religion ought to be treated alike is
the result of incorporation of the First Amendment into the Four-
129 Id at 15-16 (citations omitted).
130 See Pfeffer, supra note 51, at 96.
131 See RIcHA.DJ. GELM, PoLrrcs AND RELIGIOus Atrri.owmn. Aumuav CTHOULCS
SINCE THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL 84 (1994).
132 The new defato establishment was first described by Will Herberg in his classic
PRoTms-rmA, CATHOLIC, JEWv. AN EssAY IN AmERMIAN RELIIOUS SocIoocY 247-69
(1955).
133 Interview with Mark Chopko, General Counsel, United States Catholic Confer-
ence in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 1995).
134 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
135 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 380 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1947).
136 HowE, supra note 58.
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teenth Amendment at a time when the Court was preoccupied with
issues of racial equality.13 7 Equality, Howe argues, was the preoccupa-
tion of the middle of the twentieth century, not of the end of the
eighteenth. 138 A concern for equality, he suggests, led the Court to
abandon a special role for religion. 139 Others too have argued that it
is equality that is the dominant value of American political life.141
In his dissent in Mitchell, Justice Souter complains that three dif-
ferent kinds of neutrality have been conflated into one by the major-
ity. "'Neutrality' has been employed as a term to describe the
requisite state of government equipoise between the forbidden en-
couragement and discouragement of religion; to characterize a bene-
fit or aid as secular; and to indicate evenhandedness in distributing
it."141 This has been a progressive movement by the Court, as Souter
describes it, from the use of the term to denote the general stance of
government vis d. vis religion to a measure of the constitutionality of a
particular program in its evenhanded distribution of benefits as be-
tween religious and non-religious institutions. In this movement the
Court has gone from a requirement of what Souter calls universal neu-
trality, characterized by such programs as fire and police protection,
to a neutrality that is limited to a particular government benefit, a
benefit that in itself is not universal. 142 The danger, as Souter sees it,
is far greater in this latter use of neutrality that religion will be directly
funded by government in a way clearly feared by at least some leaders
among the founding generation.
[I]f we looked no further than evenhandedness, and failed to ask
what activities the aid might support, or in fact did support, relig-
ious schools could be blessed with government funding as massive
as expenditures made for the benefit of their public school counter-
parts, and religious missions would thrive on public money.143
Taking their cue from Scalia, religious lobbyists in the Rosenborger
case urged the Court to treat religious groups the same as other non-
religious student groups. In the brief for the Rosenberger plaintiffs, a
student religious organization, written by Michael McConnell, a law
professor at the University of Utah, plaintiffs equated Wide Awake's
Christian viewpoint to "a gay rights, racialist, or antiwar point of
137 See i&. at 71-73, 101-08.
138 See id. at 136-37.
139 See id at 149-51.
140 See, e.g., J.R. PoLE, THE PuRsurr OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HiSTORY (2d ed.
1993).
141 Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. at 2530, 2578 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 2581-82.
143 Id.
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view"'44 in terms of its constitutional significance and urged that they
be given the same First Amendment Free Speech rights as gay rights
groups, et cetera, because religion was simply another point of view.14 7
Dominus lesus and the Catholic doctrine with respect to indiffer-
entism suggest that the position now taken by the USCC on the First
Amendment-namely, that religion should be treated equally when
receiving benefits but differently when being exempt from govern-
ment regulation-denies the particularity and claim to exclusiveness
of the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, the generic demand
for protection of "religion-in-general" distorts the historical evidence,
makes understanding of the nature of human religion more difficult,
and suppresses the development of theologies of pluralism within all
religious communities. While certainly there were "Founders" who
wished to protect churches from state interference, and even Jefferson
and Madison, the bogeymen of this debate, explicitly stated their wish
to maximize religious freedom, those wishes were necessarily set in
the eighteenth-century political debate over federalism and the best
kind of government, as well as in the context of competition for mem-
bership among Protestant churches.' 46 "Religion" does not mean the
same thing today. "Religion" today is a rapidly expanding category. It
includes Santeria and the Taliban, as well as the Roman Catholic
Church. The invention of American "religion-in-general" can be seen
in part to be the result of nineteenth-century evangelizing following
the Second Great Awakening-an effort that Sidney Mead has argued
at length created an ahistorical, emotional, and anti-intellectual volun-
taristic new kind of Christianity: the denomination. 147 Today these
are non-Christian denominations, too.
Combining the ahistoricity of the "defenders of the faith" with
the egalitarian impulse of the incorporation doctrine creates a cate-
gory of "religion" which has no meaning. That situation is clearly
useful for many who wish to advance their own agenda. The specific-
ity and power of religious reality is lost when all religions are homog-
enized. Furthermore, when the argument is made that the First
Amendment was and is intended to affirmatively "protect" religion
from government, "religion" is necessarily reified and defined by gov-
ernment. It loses its prophetic value. Interpreting the First Amend-
144 Brief for Rosenberger at 17, Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1994)
(No. 94-329).
145 See i& at 15-22.
146 See SYDNEY AHLSHOM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE A-IERIC.N PEOPLE 360-84
(1972).
147 SmNEY MEA, Tim LiWELY EXPEmtENT: THE SIAING OF CHRIsMNmr" IN
AmmcA 103-87 (1963).
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ment to mean affirmative protection for "religion-in-general" distorts
both the constitutional tradition and, insofar as it is promoted by
Catholics, betrays the particularity of the Catholic Church's under-
standing of its historical identity. It conceals the theological assump-
tions inherent in the category, and it distracts both the Church and
the country from the real work of articulating how pluralism can
work.
It may seem strange that I urge an exploration of Catholic theol-
ogy in the context of the debate about the First Amendment. It may
seem that such a combination of efforts is an improper mixing of dis-
courses. But the mixing seems unavoidable if the present confusion
in the public conversation about the role of religion in American pub-
lic life is to be cleared up. Furthermore, as Joss Casanova"' 18 and
others have noted, the price Catholics must pay for a desire to be en-
gaged in the debate about the "good life" in the United States is that
they must now have their own community and its theology subject to
public debate as well. It will no longer be possible to keep internal
church politics private. The same is true of other "public" religions.
The problem of acknowledging the universal while retaining the
particular is one that is familiar to scholars of religion. Religious plu-
ralism is not a problem only for Catholics and other religious commu-
nities engaged in public theologies; it is also a problem for scholars of
religion, both at the level of religion in relation to other social reali-
ties and at the level of particular religious traditions. Religion schol-
ars right now tend to resist defining religion, in part because of a fear
of theologizing, but the presence of the word in the First Amendment
makes it necessary that Americans think about what this word means
and lends scholarship a political urgency.
148 See CASANOVA, supra note 47, at 167-207.
